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Note 
Immoral Legislation and Tax Benefits  
for Expat Corporations 
JENNIFER KARR 
Corporate tax inversions are a growing tax avoidance trend. In a corporate tax 
inversion, an American corporation changes residence from the United States to a 
foreign jurisdiction, generally without much or any change in its business operations, 
in order to avoid paying U.S. taxes. Many industrialized countries, such as the U.K. 
and Ireland, now offer much lower corporate tax rates than the U.S., and have become 
popular destinations. 
Traditionally, spectators have attempted to evaluate the morality of corporate 
decisions. In some ways, this makes sense, given recent Supreme Court cases such as 
Hobby Lobby and Citizens United, which have pushed corporations further toward 
personhood. At the same time, corporations are supposed to act in the best interest of 
shareholders, whether or not their actions are moral. For this reason, this Note 
ignores the moral nature of a corporation’s decision to invert, and instead assesses the 
U.S. laws which permit such inversions. Laws are analyzed through the lens of the 
three main theories of morality—deontology, utilitarianism, and Aristotlean virtue—as 
well as corporate social responsibility. 
In determining that corporate tax inversions not only have a negative impact on 
U.S. small businesses and general taxpayers, but often host countries as well, this Note 
offers four workable solutions. First, Congress should pass the Stop Corporate 
Inversions Act, which buffs the already active Internal Revenue Code § 7874. Second, 
the Internal Revenue Service should issue regulations in the spirit of Internal Revenue 
Code § 367 that will provide better guidelines for corporations that wish to move 
abroad. Third, the definition of “corporate residence” should be altered to include 
corporations with U.S. management. Fourth, intellectual property should be included 
in Subpart F. Finally, when passing legislation regarding corporate inversions, 
Congress must ask certain questions based in the three theories of morality in order to 
pass more moral laws. A moral body of laws will help to lessen the tax burden shifted 
to small businesses and general taxpayers by corporate tax avoidance. At the same 
time, a moral body of laws should provide benefits to corporations which are truly 
changing their place of residence for business purposes. 
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Immoral Legislation and Tax Benefits  
for Expat Corporations 
JENNIFER KARR* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Public opinion tends not to favor corporations.1 The IRS has not 
garnered high public opinion either, with only a fifty-eight percent 
approval rating, according to a Gallup poll.2 In both cases, an essential 
unfairness lies at the heart of individual taxpayers’ dissatisfaction.3 That’s 
not surprising when, “in 1953 families and individuals paid 59 per cent of 
federal revenues and corporations 41 per cent . . . this ratio has now shifted 
to approximately 80:20 in favour of corporations.”4 
According to recent estimates, “the US federal authorities lose some 
$170 billion annually to corporate tax avoidance.”5 Senator Bernie Sanders 
compiled a list of the top ten most egregious corporate tax avoiders, with 
some corporations’ tax rates being in the negative.6 Corporate inversions 
                                                                                                                          
* University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D., 2016; University of Central Florida, M.F.A. 
Creative Writing, 2013. I would like to thank Professor Stephen Utz, for thoughtful discussions and 
feedback in researching and writing this Note. I would also like to thank my colleagues on the 
Connecticut Law Review for their helpful editing.  
1 See, e.g., Julia Battilana, Multinational Corporations Under Fire From Public Opinion 
Campaigns, http://people.hbs.edu/jbattilana/ENGMay16.pdf (2011) [https://perma.cc/SJT6-UZXA] 
(discussing protest movements against multinational corporations); Frank Newport, Americans 
Similarly Dissatisfied with Corporations, Government, GALLUP (Jan. 17, 2013), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/159875/americans-similarly-dissatisfied-corporations-gov.aspx (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2016) [https://perma.cc/JG6B-2TVD] (discussing Americans’ dissatisfaction with the 
influence of large corporations on the government). 
2 Jeffrey M. Jones & Lydia Saad, Americans Sour on IRS, Rate CDC and FBI Most Positively, 
GALLUP (May 23, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/162764/americans-views-irs-sharply-negative-
2009.aspx (last visited Feb. 21, 2016) [https://perma.cc/JSE4-6LY8]. 
3 See, e.g., Robert W. Wood, Hate the IRS? You’ll Love These Laws, FORBES (Aug. 3, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2013/08/03/hate-the-irs-youll-love-these-laws/ (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2016) [https://perma.cc/NQ9W-N5TT] (detailing several scandals involving the IRS, including 
Lois Lerner’s targeting of one political group over others and IRS seizures not complying with the 
law). 
4 John Christensen & Richard Murphy, The Social Irresponsibility of Corporate Tax Avoidance: 
Taking CSR to the Bottom Line, 47 DEVELOPMENT 37, 38–39 (2004) [hereinafter Social 
Irresponsibility]. 
5 Id. at 38. 
6 Bernie Sanders, Top 10 Corporate Tax Avoiders, BERNIE SANDERS: UNITED STATES SENATOR 
FOR VERMONT, http://www.sanders.senate.gov/top-10-corporate-tax-avoiders (last visited Apr. 12, 
2016) [https://perma.cc/M4RQ-M38M]. 
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are an increasingly popular form of corporate tax avoidance.7 In possibly 
its simplest description, a corporate inversion is a “transaction[] in which a 
U.S.-based company changes its place of incorporation from the United 
States to a foreign jurisdiction, often without an accompanying change in 
its business operations . . . primarily to reduce U.S. taxation of foreign and 
even domestic income.”8  
Frequent criticisms of corporate inversions tend to involve assessing 
the morality (or lack thereof) of corporations engaging in the practice.9 
They have been described by opponents as:  
immoral, wrong, contemptible, the most blatant example of 
abusive corporate tax shelters that increasingly plague our 
country, outrageous, an unpatriotic tax dodge, a pure tax 
avoidance mechanism that is very bad public policy, a stealth 
weapon used by management to evade corporate 
accountability, disgusting, rotten, reprehensible behavior, 
awful, one of the ugliest issues that anybody has seen for a 
while, a crisis that is reaching epidemic proportions, 
troubling from a policy viewpoint, and a bad example of 
corporate tax cheating.10  
Even President Obama has used the term “unpatriotic tax loophole” 
when referring to the allowance for inversions.11 While many debate the 
morality of corporations taking advantage of legal tax “loopholes,” this 
Note, rather, looks inward at the domestic laws which both create the, at 
least perceived, need for inversions, and the ability for corporations to 
engage in them. Assessing the morality of corporations essentially is 
fruitless, as corporations are meant to act in the best interest of 
shareholders.12 But democratic governments should act in ways that benefit 
                                                                                                                          
7 DONALD J. MARPLES & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43568, CORPORATE 
EXPATRIATION, INVERSIONS, AND MERGERS: TAX ISSUES (2015) 1–2 (discussing a “second wave” of 
inversions). 
8 Joseph A. Tootle, The Regulation of Corporate Inversions and “Substantial Business 
Activities”, 33 VA. TAX REV. 353, 354 (2013). 
9 See, e.g., Social Irresponsibility, supra note 4, at 39 (arguing that various types of corporate tax 
avoidance are unethical); Susan H. Godar, Patricia J. O’Connor, & Virginia Anne Taylor, Evaluating 
the Ethics of Inversion, 61 J. BUS. ETHICS 1 (2005) (finding corporate inversions to be unethical under 
deontology and possibly utilitarianism as well) [hereinafter Ethics of Inversion].  
10 Hale E. Sheppard, Fight or Flight of U.S.-Based Multinational Businesses: Analyzing the 
Causes for, Effects of, and Solutions to the Corporate Inversion Trend, 23 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 551, 
558 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) [hereinafter Fight or Flight]. 
11 Damian Paletta & Dana Mattioli, Double Punch for Inversion Deals, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2014 
7:03 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-treasury-exploring-ways-to-deter-tax-inversions-without-
congress-1407265800 [https://perma.cc/5LBY-RYPK]. 
12 See, e.g., August Jackson, Does a Corporation Owe Fiduciary Duty to Shareholders?, CHRON, 
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/corporation-owe-fiduciary-duty-shareholders-70243.html [https://per 
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the people.13 For this reason, it is the legislation that permits corporations 
to avoid taxes which should be assessed, rather than the corporations 
themselves. 
Understanding the moral nature of corporate inversion legislation 
requires an analysis of the effects of said laws as well as the process by 
which they come to fruition. Such analysis will shed light on the 
problematic nature of the status quo and provide insight as to how 
legislators can write more effective and beneficial laws.  
Part II of this Note examines theories of morality and the history of 
corporate inversions. The major theories—utilitarianism, deontology, and 
Aristotlean Virtue—are used as explorative tools for breaking apart 
corporate inversion regulation over the past twenty-five years. It is 
important to note that, as it is the laws themselves which will be under a 
microscope, a brief analysis of whether state actors can have a moral 
component will be necessary; this question, for the most part, is answered 
in the affirmative. These theories provide a way to better understand the 
persisting problems with inversion legislation and provide guidance in 
creating a more moral body of laws. 
Part III discusses the problems in the current system. A large part of 
why present legislation falls short is its piecemeal nature. One might 
picture it as a sinking ship with a growing number of holes. Instead of 
focusing on the big picture, legislators are focusing on slowly patching 
each individual hole, as more and more come into being. Further, Congress 
seems reluctant to fully commit to any specific type of regulation. This 
lack of focus and commitment have led to large companies continuing to 
move abroad, which is a loss in tax revenue for the U.S.  
Part IV offers solutions for both creating more moral laws, and for 
altering the current laws in ways that will best benefit the country. In a 
theoretical sense, it would be beneficial for politicians to examine the 
moral nature of legislation passed. Perhaps more pragmatically (and 
realistically), however, there are several more concrete, workable solutions 
which should help to lessen the rush to invert. Current corporate inversion 
law should be buffed by the passage of legislation which was proposed in 
2014. That legislation would strengthen § 7874. Congress should also alter 
the definition of corporate residence and offer clear regulations for 
corporations which truly want to move abroad. Finally, intellectual 
property (IP) should no longer be excluded from Subpart F. 
 On one hand, these changes would make it more difficult for U.S. 
                                                                                                                          
ma.cc/57E6-UCHB] (discussing a corporation’s fiduciary duties to shareholders) (last visited Feb. 21, 
2016). 
13 What is Democracy?, LECTURE AT HILLA UNIVERSITY FOR HUMANISTIC STUDIES (2004), 
https://web.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/iraq/whaisdemocracy012004.htm (last visited Feb 14, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/67PM-5VRX]. 
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corporations to invert. On the other hand, they would make it easier for 
truly international corporations to change their place of corporate 
residence. As will be explored further in this Note, some proposed 
solutions are simply not workable—for example lowering the corporate tax 
rate in order to compete with European countries would likely lead to an 
unsustainable burden on small businesses and individual taxpayers. There 
must be clear guidelines for corporations wishing to change their corporate 
residence, and these residency changes ought to be evaluated on a case-by-
case basis.  
Finally, Part V concludes this Note. 
II. THE CORPORATION, THE INVERSION, AND MORALITY 
A. Evolution of the Modern Corporation 
Summarizing the evolution of the modern corporation can lend some 
insight as to why our laws exist as they do today. While modern 
corporations are seen as for-profit businesses, prior to the nineteenth 
century they were actually “formed chiefly for political or charitable 
purposes.”14 At the beginning of United States history, state legislatures 
chose participants and terms for corporations, which were established by 
the state issuing special acts.15 These state-created corporations formed “in 
order to address public needs, such as transportation or infrastructure.”16 
Because of public displeasure and the burden placed on the legislative 
system, incorporation became available to everyone in the early nineteenth 
century—though each state government had to create its own incorporation 
statutes.17  
In the twentieth century, incorporation statutes moved further and 
further away from government regulation.18 New Jersey was the first state 
to allow corporations to hold stock in other corporations, making many 
modern corporate structures possible.19 The states also permitted 
corporations to: exist perpetually, organize for any (lawful) purpose except 
banking, amend certificates of incorporation, own stock in other 
corporations, own unlimited land, and merge with other corporations.20 
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, states “race[d]” to deregulate.21 
Deregulation meant attracting more corporations to the state, bringing 
                                                                                                                          
14 WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATION 90 (4th ed. 2012). 
15 Id. at 90. 
16 Id. at 91. 
17 Id.  
18 Id. 92. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 92–93. 
21 Id. 93. 
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business as well as corporation franchise fees to the state.22 In more recent 
history, however, the judiciary and federal securities laws have imposed 
some regulations on public corporations, in the “flavor of early corporation 
law.”23 Yet, with Delaware as the most popular state for incorporation, the 
Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) is a “nonregulatory, enabling 
statute with few mandatory features.”24 
Notably, since corporations now have a history of being designed by 
the states, with federal commissions playing a regulatory part, a tension 
between federal and state governments may reduce the ability of the 
federal government to act morally when lawmakers feel they must defer to 
the states. 
B. The United States’ System 
While some countries employ a territorial system of taxation,25 the 
United States imposes a worldwide system.26 In some cases, this results in 
double taxation because corporations are taxed on: (1) domestic income 
and (2) foreign income.27 To avoid double taxation, the United States 
issues limited foreign tax credits equal to the amount of taxes the 
corporation paid on their foreign income.28 
Further, the U.S. is a liberal market economy, which emphasizes 
“arm’s length relationships and public trading.”29 A feature of the liberal 
market economy is its flexible regulatory structure, which “benefits 
industries targeting low costs and those operating in sectors characterized 
by radical innovation.”30 Liberal market economies best fit within the 
                                                                                                                          
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 94. 
24 Id. at 93 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
25 See Tootle, supra note 8, at 357 (“Under a territorial system, a nation taxes only income from 
sources within its boundaries.”). 
26 See id. at 356 (describing the United States’ worldwide system of taxation). 
27 See id. (“Under a worldwide system, a nation taxes both the domestic income of its citizens and 
residents, and the income of its citizens and residents that is earned in foreign nations.”); Fight or 
Flight, supra note 10, at 552–53 (“U.S. tax applies to income earned by the foreign corporation that is 
‘effectively connected’ with the ‘conduct of a trade or business’ within the United States. In addition, a 
foreign corporation is generally subject to a thirty percent tax when it receives certain passive income 
derived from sources within the United States.”).  
28 See Tootle, supra note 8, at 356 (“[T]he United States uses a system of foreign tax credits 
[which] . . . reduces a citizen’s or resident’s U.S. income tax liability by the amount of foreign income 
taxes paid on foreign source income.”). 
29 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporate Taxation and Corporate Social Responsibility, 11 N.Y.U. J. 
LAW & BUS. 1, 17 (2009) [hereinafter Taxation]. Other nations can be corporatist, like Germany and 
Japan, relying on “tightly integrated private and networked associations to resolve significant dilemmas 
of economic integration,” or statist, like France, “depend[ing] on hierarchical solutions in resolving 
coordination problems.” Id. at 16. 
30 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporate Social Responsibility and Strategic Tax Behavior, 6 (John M. 
Olin Ctr. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 69, 2006) at 10 [hereinafter Strategic Tax Behavior]. 
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aggregate or “nexus of contracts” view of the corporation.31 Proponents of 
the aggregate view argue that the corporation is “an aggregate of its 
members or shareholders” (as opposed to a “creature of the state” under the 
artificial entity theory, or a “separate entity controlled by its managers” 
under the real entity theory).32 The implications of subscribing to the 
aggregate view will be discussed, infra.  
C. From the First Corporate Tax Inversion to the Modern Inversion 
While there are several different models of corporate inversions,33 the 
first known inversion occurred in 1983 by McDermott, Inc.34 McDermott 
had a wholly-owned Panamanian subsidiary.35 That subsidiary issued to 
McDermott shareholders an amount of common stock equal to ninety 
percent of its voting power.36 In exchange, the Panamanian subsidiary 
received about sixty-eight percent of the stock of its parent company.37 In 
effect, McDermott became an international corporation through its 
Panamanian subsidiary, but the American shareholders held most of the 
power over the company.  
After the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) unsuccessfully challenged the 
McDermott inversion, Congress enacted Section 1248(i)38 of the Internal 
Revenue Code (“IRC” or “the Code”).39 Essentially, Section 1248(i) treats 
an exchange of stock between domestic shareholders of a foreign 
corporation and the foreign corporation as a dividend.40 So, in an exchange 
like McDermott’s, the shares should be treated as though they had first 
                                                                                                                          
31 See Taxation, supra note 29, at 12, 17 (“The liberal model . . . best fits the aggregate theory of 
the firm.”). 
32 Id. at 12, 15. 
33 In stock transactions, “the shareholders of a U.S. corporation exchange their shares for stock in 
a foreign corporation.” Tootle, supra note 8, at 363. Reincorporations, or asset transactions, involve a 
U.S. corporation merging with its foreign parent, and the foreign parent surviving. Id. In a drop-down 
transaction, “the U.S. corporation transfers its assets to the foreign parent through a reincorporation and 
the foreign parent immediately contributes some of those assets to a newly formed U.S. subsidiary.” Id. 
A spin-off involves a multinational creating a foreign subsidiary “to which is contributes the business it 
desires to divest.” Id. at 364. 
34 See id. at 364 (discussing the McDermott transaction). This first corporate inversion was 
structured as a stock transaction. Id. at 364–65. Notably, the McDermott inversion has lagged the S&P 
eighty-five percent since their inversion was completed. Kevin Drawbaugh, “Inversions” Don’t Always 
Benefit Investors, WASH. POST., Aug. 19, 2014, at A09.  
35 See Peter Canellos, Acquisition of Issuer Securities by a Controlled Entity: Peter Pan Seafoods, 
May Department Stores, and McDermott, 45 TAX LAWYER 1, 10 (1991) (discussing McDermott’s 
transaction with its Panamanian subsidiary). 
36 Id. at 10. 
37 Id. 
38 26 U.S.C. § 1248(i) (2012). 
39 See Tootle, supra note 8, at 365 (“Although the Service was unsuccessful in its challenge 
[against McDermott], the transaction prompted Congress to enact Section 1248(i) of the Code.”). 
40 26 U.S.C. § 1248(i) (2012). 
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been issued to the domestic McDermott corporation, and then distributed to 
shareholders as dividends.41 The result would be taxation on the dividends.   
Following the enactment of Section 1248(i), in 1989, Congress enacted 
Section 163(j),42 which was “designed to deter interest stripping 
transactions.”43 However, since it only applies to corporations with debt to 
equity ratios of 1.5 to 1 or more, “it is generally accepted that the provision 
does not deter interest stripping transactions.”44   
After a second corporation inverted in 1994, the IRS “issued new 
regulations under Section 367(a)45 of the Code that made transfers of stock 
of domestic corporations to foreign corporations taxable if, in the 
aggregate, all U.S. transferors owned 50% or more of the stock of the 
foreign parent by vote or by value immediately after the exchange.”46 
Under Section 367(a), transfers of stock from a U.S. corporation to a 
foreign corporation are taxable.47  
Inversions resurfaced with gusto in the late 1990s and early 2000s.48 
Within the American Jobs Creation Act of 200449 lies Section 787450 of the 
IRC. Section 7874 applies to “corporate inversions after which a certain 
percentage of former shareholders of the U.S. company own stock in the 
foreign parent company, or the ‘surrogate foreign corporation’ in the 
statute’s language.”51 
There are two main provisions in Section 7874.52 First, if shareholders 
who originally held stock in the domestic corporation, or former corporate 
partners who owned capital or profit interest in the domestic corporation, 
                                                                                                                          
41 Canellos, supra note 35, at 10–11 (explaining how Section 1248(i) would apply to an inversion 
like McDermott’s). 
42 26 U.S.C. § 163j (2012). 
43 Tootle, supra note 8, at 365. In an interest stripping transaction, either the new foreign parent or 
another related party extends a loan to the U.S. operating company. The U.S. operating company then 
pays what is nominal “interest” to its parent and deducts the amount paid from its U.S. source taxable 
income. Ordinarily, the foreign parent is obligated to pay the 30% U.S. withholding tax on the interest 
it receives from the U.S. operating company. Through careful use of international tax treaties, however, 
the U.S. tax liability on the interest paid to the foreign parent may be greatly reduced or altogether 
avoided. Further, it is possible that under the foreign nation’s laws, the foreign parent corporation will 
not be taxed on the interest received. Id. at 361–62. 
44 Id. at 366. 
45 26 U.S.C. § 367(a). 
46 Tootle, supra note 8, at 366. 
47 26 U.S.C. § 367(a). 
48 Tootle, supra note 8, at 366–67 (“Despite [the regulations’] effect, more large corporations 
inverted during the latter half of the 1990s, including Triton Energy, Tyco, Fruit of the Loom, Gold 
Reserve Corporation, Transocean, and White Mountain Insurance Group. The economic downturn of 
the early 2000s reduced the impact of the section 367(a) regulations . . . which may have prompted 
more inversions.”). 
49 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418. 
50 26 U.S.C. § 7874 (2012). 
51 Tootle, supra note 8, at 368. 
52 26 U.S.C. § 7874(a)(2) (2012). 
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own sixty percent of the stock in the foreign corporation, the foreign 
corporation is considered a surrogate foreign corporation.53 Second, if 
either of the same groups of people own eighty percent of the foreign 
company’s stock, then the foreign company is treated as a domestic 
corporation.54 However, there is an exception. In both of these cases, the 
foreign corporations are not considered foreign surrogates or domestic 
corporations if they have “substantial business activity” in the foreign 
country.55 Because of the “substantial business activity” rule, and because 
previously popular inversion countries (like the Cayman Islands and 
Bermuda) do not have a lot of economic activity, countries like Ireland, 
Switzerland, and the UK are now popular destinations.56 
 In a sixty-percent inversion, the yearly taxable gain cannot be less than 
the inversion gain.57 “Inversion gains include any gain on property or stock 
transferred to the foreign parent, and any licensing income on that 
property, without offset for losses or credits other than the foreign tax 
credit.”58 Otherwise, these inversions are not “pure” inversions and are 
treated “leniently.”59 
Section 7874 hasn’t been entirely prohibitive, as corporations can 
simply keep their corporate structure as is while reinvesting revenue 
overseas, which allows for indefinite deferral on tax payments.60 Further, 
multinational corporations have shifted about seventy-five billion dollars 
out of the country by “investing in active sectors like Ireland 
manufacturing.”61 
Finally, according to Tyler Dumler, Section 7874 may only have 
diverted some possible inversions to other tax avoidance tactics: 
[Multi-national corporations] are now eroding the U.S. tax 
revenue base through alternative methods. Such methods 
include: income trapping using indefinite deferrals of active 
income in foreign countries; repatriation of excessive foreign 
tax credits; avoidance of taxation on holding companies in 
low-tax jurisdictions using “check the box” regulations and 
hybrid entities; continuing to increase debt shares in high-tax 
                                                                                                                          
53 26 U.S.C. § 7874(a)(2)(B)(ii)(I). 
54 26 U.S.C. § 7874(b). 
55 26 U.S.C. § 7874(a)(2)(B)(iii). 
56 MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 7, at 6 (discussing how the business activity exemption has 
caused some corporations to invert in European countries). 
57 26 U.S.C. § 7874(a)(1). 
58 Tootle, supra note 8, at 369. 
59 Id. at 369–70. 
60 Tyler M. Dumler, Charging Less to Make More: The Causes and Effects of the Corporate 
Inversion Trend in the U.S. and the Implications of Lowering the Corporate Tax Rate, 13 U.C. DAVIS 
BUS. L.J. 89, 89 (2012). 
61 Id. at 89–90. 
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jurisdictions to take advantage of applicable interest credits; 
and related tax planning behavior.62 
Current Congressional considerations will be discussed, infra. Now 
that the current status of inversions and corporate inversion law has been 
discussed, an exploration of moral theories will show how our laws should 
be evaluated. 
D. Basics of Morality 
For the purposes of this note, I focus the discussion mainly on 
utilitarianism and Kant’s deontological theory, while also touching on 
Aristotelian virtue.63 A discussion of whether or not these theories of 
morality and ethics are truly applicable to state actors will be reserved for 
later in the Note.64    
1. Utilitarianism 
Utilitarianism describes a set of consequentialist theories; 
consequentialism describes moral theories where normative properties 
depend only on consequences, whereas utilitarian theories focus on 
aggregate welfare.65 Under utilitarianism, “[o]ur basic ethical concern is to 
bring it about, so far as we can, that there is more welfare or utility in the 
world rather than less, and, in the simplest version of utilitarianism, we 
should simply act in the most efficient way to bring that about.”66 Because 
utilitarianism is a type of consequentialism,67 the moral goodness of an act 
depends not on the actor’s motives or intentions, but on the outcome, or 
consequence, of her action.68 So, for example, if an actor knew that killing 
one person would save one hundred other people, under a utilitarian moral 
theory that killing would likely be considered morally just. 
To be clear, though utilitarianism is a form of consequentialism, the 
two are not synonymous. Consequentialists believe that, by any means, an 
                                                                                                                          
62 Id. at 94–95. 
63 These are the three theories that generally influence public policy debates. STEPHEN UTZ, TAX 
POLICY: AN INTRODUCTION AND SURVEY OF THE PRINCIPAL DEBATES 35 (1993) [hereinafter TAX 
POLICY]. For a more in depth discussion of these theories, see, for example, Stephen Utz, Chapter 
Three: How Taxes Affect People’s Welfare, in TAX POLICY: AN INTRODUCTION AND SURVEY OF THE 
PRINCIPAL DEBATES (1993); Bernard Williams, Chapter Three: Foundations: Well-Being, in ETHICS 
AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY; Bernard Williams, Chapter Five: Styles of Ethical Theory, in ETHICS 
AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY (1985). 
64 See infra Part II.E. 
65 See WILLIAMS, supra note 64, at 75 (“All the variants [of ultilitarians] agree on aggregating 
welfare, that is to say, adding together in some way the welfare of all the individuals involved.”).  
66 Id. at 77. 
67 Id. at 35–36 (referring to utilitarianism as a type of “welfarist consequentialism”). 
68 See TAX POLICY, supra note 63, at 35 (“Consequentialism is the view that in evaluating 
alternative courses of conduct as good or bad, not with respect to other goals but as such, we need only 
consider the consequences of the available choices.”). 
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end that produces good is morally good (but there is disagreement about 
how to determine which consequences are “good” and which are “bad”).69 
Utilitarians care about producing the greatest amount of pleasure (mental 
pleasure, specifically, according to John Stuart Mill) for the greatest 
amount of people.70  
Mill emphasized mental pleasure as utility, and therefore mental 
pleasures as uniquely valuable.71 In his Principles of Political Economy, he 
argues that, in matters of taxation, “whatever sacrifices [the government] 
requires from [persons or classes] should be made to bear as nearly as 
possible with the same pressure upon all, which, it must be observed, is the 
mode by which least sacrifice is occasioned on the whole.”72 Further, he 
argued, “[e]quality of taxation . . . means equality of sacrifice.”73 This, 
however, poses further questions. What exactly does “equality of sacrifice” 
entail? Surely a middle class person paying a fifteen percent marginal tax 
rate still bears more of a relative burden than a billionaire paying a tax rate 
as high as even ninety percent. A much more in depth discussion of this 
particular point is beyond the scope of this note, but the question should be 
considered when discussing possible legislative changes. 
A problem with evaluating actions from a utilitarian moral theory is 
that the ultimate consequences of an action may not be clear for some 
time.74 As an extreme example, consider a person with a time machine. She 
utilizes the time machine to return to early twentieth century Germany and 
kills Hitler. By doing this, she saves the lives of more than six million 
people. While it seems like the death of one has clearly produced the 
greatest amount of happiness by saving the lives of so many others, what 
if, as a result of the Holocaust not happening, an even more expansive 
genocide takes place in the future? This very problem is more than evident 
in recent anti-inversion legislation. While lawmakers may (or may not) 
believe they are creating laws that will benefit the greatest amount of 
people, they may actually be harming more than they are helping. For 
example, consider a raise in the corporate tax for the purpose of funding 
more social programs. Suppose that, at first, the extra revenue does, in fact, 
fulfill this purpose. But suppose then, that corporations find ways to shelter 
                                                                                                                          
69 See Corey A. Ciochetti, Tricky Business: A Decision-Making Framework for Legally Sound, 
Ethically Suspect Business Tactics, 12 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 1, 9 (2013) (“[T]he 
means . . . to obtain [an] end are morally irrelevant as long as good is produced.”). 
70 See id. at 11 (“To Mill, good actions were those that produce the greatest mental pleasure 
(happiness or well-being) and bad actions are those that tend to produce mental pain (unhappiness).”). 
71 See JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 42, 445 (1848) (discussing 
value, nature, and scarcity). 
72 Id. at 804. 
73 Id. 
74 See Ciochetti, supra note 69, at 12 (“[T]he consequences of an action are not always clear and 
it is exceptionally difficult to understand how these uncertain consequences will help or harm other 
people.”). 
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their money, resulting in an actual reduction of overall revenue collected, 
and new social programs that can no longer be sustained. Though the 
lawmakers might have had pure intentions, their action resulting in a 
negative consequence cannot be considered moral from a utilitarian 
viewpoint. 
Notably, business ethics professor Corey A. Ciochetti writes, 
“evaluating the greatest good for the greatest number of people is a time 
consuming process. Many moral decisions require a much faster answer.”75 
Time is an interesting factor when applied to state actors who have much 
greater resources than the average person and who act at a different pace 
entirely than the average person.  
2. Deontology 
Conversely, while deontology does take consequences into account, 
the real focus of an act’s moral nature lies in the actor’s intention or 
motivation.76 According to Kant, “[n]othing in the world—indeed nothing 
even beyond the world—can possibly be conceived which could be called 
good without qualification except a good will.”77 So, if an actor’s intent in 
killing someone is nothing other than to take their life, then the act would 
most likely not be considered moral under a deontological view, even if the 
unintended consequence is to save the lives of others. Think of deontology 
as choosing the “right” thing to do instead of the “good” thing to do.78 
That’s all fine when applied to individuals, but questions arise when 
applying deontology to governments (especially democratic governments).  
Under Kant’s theory of deontology, an action is only moral if both the 
action and the reason for the action “can be willed as universal law.”79 
Ciochetti identifies three steps in determining whether an action is moral 
under Kantian theory: (1) “define a . . . statement[] that states your reason 
for acting as you propose;” (2) ask “can this decision be universalized?”; 
(3) ask “would you want to live in such a world?”80 So, under a Kantian 
view of morality, it would be imperative to know the reason for the 
government’s action, to consider whether such laws can be universalized, 
and to determine whether such a world would be beneficial. The high 
probability that corporate inversions are deontologically immoral is 
                                                                                                                          
75 Id.  
76 TAX POLICY, supra note 63, at 37 (“The essential feature of deontological ethical theories is 
their insistence on the role of intention or motivation in giving value to actions and, derivatively, to the 
consequences of action.”). 
77 IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS IN THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 393 (1785). 
78 Ciochetti, supra note 69, at 13 (“[E]mphasis is on the ‘right thing to do’ rather than the ‘good 
thing to do.’”). 
79 Ethics of Inversion, supra note 9, at 3. 
80 Ciochetti, supra note 69, at 15–16. 
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obvious.81 But, with the (arguably optimistic) understanding that 
corporations govern themselves to benefit shareholders and the U.S. 
government exists only by and for the people, surely corporations and 
governments ought to have different, even competing, motivations. 
“Kant argued that people have the capacity to act out of [a] sense of 
duty because people have the ability to reason.”82 Can governments 
reason? Certainly, governments are made up of people, who presumably 
have the ability to reason. And each legislator in a democratic government 
is elected by a majority of her constituents, who also have the ability to 
reason. But laws are not made by single representatives, which leaves us 
with the question: can a large group of lawmakers be considered in the 
same light as an individual? This question will be discussed infra. 
3. Virtue 
To evaluate one’s morality from Aristotle’s virtue-based perspective, 
one must evaluate the actor as a whole. The consequences of an actor’s 
actions and the intentions of any one given act are less important than an 
individual’s whole moral past.83 So, if an actor who has generally acted 
with bad will and to negative consequences commits a good act, that act 
will not be considered as good as if an actor who has generally acted with 
good will and to positive consequences commits the same act.84 Put more 
eloquently, “[f]or Aristotle . . . practical reason required the dispositions of 
action and feeling to be harmonized; if any disposition was properly to 
count as a virtue, it had to be part of a rational structure that included all 
the virtues.”85 
Unlike utilitarianism and deontology, Aristotlean virtue does not base 
itself on any given act. Put succinctly, while a utilitarian might ask, “What 
was the outcome of his action?” and a deontologist might ask, “What was 
the motivation for her action?,” under the virtue-based theory, one might 
ask, “Is he living his life with the goal of being a good person?”86 A 
virtuous person is one with good character.87  
But applying virtue to states is problematic when one considers this 
definition of virtue: “an acquired human quality the possession and 
exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are 
                                                                                                                          
81 Ethics of Inversion, supra note 9, at 3 (claiming that under Kantian deontology, corporate 
inversions are immoral). 
82 Ciochetti, supra note 69, at 14. 
83 UTZ, supra note 63, at 38. 
84 See id. (“Not only the moral habits of the agent, but the opportunities for forming them are 
important in assessing how good the individual acts of this person are, and how good the person as a 
whole is.”). 
85 WILLIAMS, supra note 63, at 36. 
86 Ciochetti, supra note 70, at 18–19. 
87 See id. at 19 (“The key to [v]irtue [e]thics is the development of . . . a good character.”). 
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internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from 
achieving any such goods.”88 States are obviously, by definition, not 
human. Suppose “human” was left out of the definition. Can states 
“acquire” qualities? Certainly over time governments have changed—some 
for the better and some for the worse. Given the advances in social justice 
made since the inception of our nation, it would be easy to argue that the 
United States has evolved for the better. 
Yet, Aristotlean virtue is even harder to apply to states when one 
considers that “for Aristotle virtue was an internalized disposition of 
action, desire, and feeling . . . It involves the agent’s exercise of 
judgment . . . [and] favorable and unfavorable reactions to other people, 
their characters and actions.”89 Although Aristotle referred to the 
individual, it is worth considering the implications of applying his theory 
to governmental bodies. In any case, applying Aristotlean virtue to state 
actors is challenging, in the least. 
4. Corporate Social Responsibility 
Worthy of note, though perhaps not incredibly helpful, is a critical 
theory specific to corporations called Corporate Social Responsibility 
(“CSR”). CSR theorists examine “the obligations and inclinations, if any, 
of corporations organized for profit, voluntarily to pursue social ends that 
conflict with the presumptive shareholder desire to maximize profit.”90 For 
instance, in one CSR article, the writers reject the idea that there should be 
no distinction between the legality and morality of corporate tax 
avoidance.91 Interestingly, the writers of that same article conclude that, in 
order to curb tax avoidance and other harmful tax practices, global 
initiatives (not corporations themselves) must be utilized to create a 
framework to “balance the need [of] sovereign states to protect their tax 
revenues from aggressive tax avoidance, with a respect for the right of 
democratic governments to determine a tax rate appropriate to their 
circumstances.”92 Finally, the writers advocate for a worldwide, rather than 
                                                                                                                          
88 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 190–91 (2d ed., 1984). 
Virtue ethics focus on a definition of character which is based upon a determined list of twelve good 
attributes that fall into a golden mean between two vices (e.g., bravery is a virtue between the vices of 
cowardice and foolhardiness). This list is not determined in any principled or analytical way. This 
poses further questions when determining what values would comprise the character of a virtuous state. 
Aristotle’s Ethics Table of Virtue and Vices, CENTRAL WASH. UNIV., http://www.cwu.edu/~warren/
unit1/aristotles_virtues_and_vices.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2016) [https://perma.cc/Q5AX-X6HR]. 
89 WILLIAMS, supra note 63, at 35–36. 
90 David L. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5–6 
(1979). 
91 See Social Irresponsibility, supra note 4, at 39 (“It is not possible to be ethical in one area of 
business conduct and to act otherwise in another area.”). 
92 Id. at 42. 
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a territorial system.93  
But, while CSR theorists comment on the ethics and morality of 
corporate actions and on possible solutions to problems, they stop short of 
examining the morality and ethics of the laws themselves. Rather, it seems 
that they view laws as tools, instead of things with innately measurable 
morality. In fact, this is one of the criticisms in international tax expert 
Reuven Avi-Yonah’s working paper, Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Strategic Tax Behavior. Avi-Yonah points out the “illegitima[cy]” of CSR 
under the aggregate view of the corporation.94 Continuing under the 
aggregate view, he further argues, “if corporations are not permitted to 
engage in CSR, then all social responsibility functions devolve on the 
state . . . But if corporate managers are required to minimize tax payments 
as much as possible, that could mean that the state is left without adequate 
resources to fulfill its governmental function.”95 Notably, most European 
Union governments utilize CSR programs.96 
Given Avi-Yonah’s argument, if, as in a liberal market economy, the 
United States adopts an aggregate view of the corporation, this creates a 
catch-22. If the moral responsibility to perform all socially conscious 
functions falls on the state, then it would follow that it is the state’s 
responsibility to collect as much revenue as possible in order to fund social 
programs. Yet, according to Avi-Yonah, the aggregate view leaves the 
corporation with no moral responsibility to pay taxes not required by the 
state.97 So, either CSR is illegitimate as a critical theory, or one-hundred 
percent of the moral responsibility falls on the state. Avi-Yonah gives the 
following example of an instance where it is only the state’s obligation to 
remedy a crisis. In the event of a health crisis, corporations owe no 
obligation to address it.98 However, the resources the state needs are funded 
by taxes—many of which are collected from corporations.99 While Avi-
Yonah argues that, despite the aggregate view, the state “can expect the 
corporation to contribute its fair share to the ability of the state to fulfill its 
obligations,”100 what exactly “fair share” means or how to go about 
adequately collecting it is much less obvious. 
Perhaps the failings of CSR theories are highlighted most here. While 
                                                                                                                          
93 Id. 
94 Strategic Tax Behavior, supra note 30, at 3–4, 19, 23. 
95 Id. at 5. 
96 See id. at 11 (“Practically every EU government (including even the UK) has programs 
designed to foster CSR.”). See generally European Commission, Corporate Social Responsibility: 
National Public Policy in the European Union (2004), http://www.ec.europa.eu/social/ 
BlobServlet?docId=2036&langId=en (last visited Feb. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/Y6ZJ-LV2Q]. 
97 See Strategic Tax Behavior, supra note 30, at 3–5. 
98 Id. at 14–15. 
99 Id. at 15. 
100 Id. 
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the artificial entity and real entity views place responsibility on 
corporations to act morally (or, at least, in a socially responsible way), the 
aggregate view requires that corporations pay their fair share.101 
Furthermore, despite any of the CSR theories imposing moral obligation on 
corporations, Learned Hand famously stated in Helvering v. Gregory,102 
that there is “not even a patriotic duty” to pay more taxes than the 
minimum required.103 Notably, in Gregory, Hand assessed a tax deficiency 
against corporate tax evaders.104 
However, Avi-Yonah provides this particularly illuminating point: 
“[e]ven if from the perspective of management CSR is an illegitimate tax 
on shareholders, the government could still legitimately try to encourage 
corporations to engage in CSR by giving tax incentives.”105 In the next 
subsection, this Note addresses the questions previously raised in the 
utilitarian, deontology, and virtue sections: that is, whether a state can be a 
moral actor. 
E. Can States Act Morally? 
Since the theories of morality introduced in this Note have mainly 
concerned individuals, the question of whether states can act morally is 
really a question of the legitimacy of applying said theories to states. If 
determined that one in good conscious cannot apply any of the most 
explored theories of morality to states, it begs the question: does any 
responsibility on the state exist?   
Let’s begin by considering one theory of what makes an actor moral: 
“[w]hat gives the capacity to make decisions a moral cast is the ability of 
the individual and external observers to evaluate the decision and its 
consequences from a distinctly moral perspective.”106 There are really two 
points to this inquiry. First, can the “individual” (the state in our case) 
evaluate its own decisions and consequences from a moral perspective? 
Second, can external observers evaluate the state’s decisions from a moral 
perspective? 
In response to the first pointed question, the U.S. government evaluates 
its own laws in multiple ways. A law can be upheld or overturned by a 
Supreme Court ruling.107 The president can make an executive order.108 
                                                                                                                          
101 Id. at 23. 
102 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934). 
103 Id. at 810. 
104 Id. at 811. 
105 Strategic Tax Behavior, supra note 30, at 5. 
106 DAVID C. THOMASMA & DAVID N. WEISSTUB, THE VARIABLES OF MORAL CAPACITY 10 
(2004). 
107 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (establishing judicial review). 
108 U.S. CONST. art. 2, §§ 1, 3. 
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And Congress can create new laws to replace old ones that it feels are no 
longer appropriate or just.109 But when the Supreme Court, Congress, or 
the president make and overturn laws, are they doing so from a moral 
perspective? In other words, when the Supreme Court chooses to uphold a 
law, are they basing their decision in any part on utilitarianism, deontology, 
Aristotlean virtue, or any other moral perspective? 
Comments from justices post-decision could help determine whether or 
not morality comes into play. For instance, after the famous Citizens 
United110 ruling, Justice Ginsburg said that it is the one ruling she would 
overturn if she could choose one, and that it “pave[s] the way for more 
unfettered campaign spending by corporations.”111 In this comment, Justice 
Ginsburg takes a utilitarian stance by considering the effects the decision 
could have on future elections. In fact, given our standard of stare decisis, 
perhaps all court decisions are utilitarian because each decision must look 
to future effects. Conversely, stare decisis almost requires that justices only 
evaluate and alter past decisions in the most extreme circumstances. So its 
evaluation of laws can, most likely, be evaluated from a moral perspective. 
At the same time, the moral determination of the Supreme Court’s ability 
(or willingness, perhaps) to evaluate its own past decisions is hazier. 
As to the question of external observers, given the wealth of articles 
written about many of our laws, executive orders, and Supreme Court 
decisions, this second prong appears to be much more easily met. 
The idea of states acting morally (or immorally) is not a new one. 
Machiavelli viewed states as potential moral actors.112 He even recognized 
that states are made up of human leaders. For instance, in Discourses he 
wrote, “[h]appy is that state which produces a man prudent enough to 
provide it with laws and institutions by which it may live securely without 
any need to alter them.”113 Machiavelli continued, “least happy of all is the 
one whose institutions are entirely off the path that leads to a right and 
perfect end.”114 He discusses government’s regard for civil rights.115 
Further, he posited that “laws make men good.”116 Laws accomplish this 
                                                                                                                          
109 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. 
110 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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112 See infra, notes 114–19 and accompanying text. 
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(Daniel Donno ed., Daniel Donno trans., Bantam Books 1981) (1513). 
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116 See id. at 96. 
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feat by imposing morality on men.117 Particularly relevant to the discussion 
of whether corporate inversion laws are moral or not is his assertion that 
“all laws enacted to increase liberty derive from the conflict between [the 
common people and the aristocrats].”118 In fact, Machiavelli’s The Prince, 
while directed towards a “prince” or other national leader, is really directed 
towards a state government.119 Like a nation governed by royalty, a 
democratic nation is ruled by modern-day royals—of which are people 
who can act morally or immorally.  
Another argument for regarding states as moral actors is that, in the 
contemporary global world, states can even assess and affect the morality 
of other states. For example, “a state actor can draw attention to a violation 
of a moral norm [and] make it a focus of international discussion and 
action.”120  
But what of Aristotlean virtue? While utilitarianism and deontology are 
more easily applicable to states, is it possible to apply a virtue theory to a 
state? To do so, one could look at a nation’s history and body of laws. By 
doing this with the U.S., one could argue that the nation is not necessarily 
moral because it has not always acted morally;121 yet it arguably has 
become more moral over time.122 But a problem still exists. This note 
contends that part of the reason nations can be moral (or immoral) is 
because they are governed by humans.123 But, while the nation has its own 
body of laws stretching back to its founding, the people who govern have 
changed many times over. Although one can evaluate long-term outcomes 
and even legislators’ intentions from a moral standpoint, perhaps it is 
impossible to apply Aristotlean virtue when the human actors in charge 
constantly change. 
Overall, while some theorists might disagree, it does seem possible to 
apply morality to states, at least in the sense of deontology, and certainly 
utilitarianism. In the next section, having accepted states as moral actors 
under the theories of utilitarianism and deontology, this Note applies these 
theories to our body of corporate tax inversion laws. 
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III. THE IMMORAL STATE 
Having discussed the leading theories of morality, let us return to 
modern corporate tax inversions, to see how our inversion laws fare. 
Corporate inversions affect both the U.S. and their host country. A 2002 
Treasury report “identified three main concerns about corporate inversions: 
erosion of the U.S. tax base, a cost advantage for foreign-controlled firms, 
and a reduction in perceived fairness of the tax system.”124 In this section, 
these and other concerns will be discussed. 
A. Financial Cost  
Corporate inversions cost the U.S. billions of dollars annually.125 As 
Tyler Dumler points out, even though the U.S. Treasury has lost billions of 
dollars to inversions, it is “still responsible for generating adequate revenue 
to fund the government budget.”126 According to Dumler, this amalgam of 
loss and persisting need results in a greater tax burden for individuals and 
domestic businesses.127 Hale E. Sheppard agrees, writing “the number of 
corporations that are paying taxes in the United States decreases as the 
frequency of inversions increases, thereby making the remaining U.S. 
taxpayers responsible for a larger portion of the government budget.”128 
According to the U.S. Treasury, President Obama’s plan to eliminate 
inversions will raise $17 billion over the next ten years.129 
And what if U.S. corporations choose not to ever repatriate foreign 
income? Many never do, and current estimates are that about $1.7 trillion 
in foreign earnings of U.S. corporations remain abroad.130 That is $1.7 
trillion untaxed in the U.S. and not used in the U.S. market. Or, think of it 
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130 See Joshua Simpson, Analyzing Corporate Inversions and Proposed Changes to the 
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as a $1.7 trillion tax deficit that must be made up by someone. 
B. Effects on Host Countries 
Ireland, in particular, does not want to be perceived as a tax haven.131 
With an already low corporate tax rate of 12.5 percent, Ireland offered a 
zero percent tax rate for transfers of intellectual property from one Irish-
registered subsidiary to another.132 As of October 2014, Ireland is 
attempting to close that loophole by requiring all Irish-registered 
companies to become tax residents in Ireland within the next six years.133 
While this will require a corporation to do more than just register in 
Ireland, it still leaves open a huge opportunity for tax benefit for U.S. 
intellectual property companies that invert. In fact, it seems that Ireland has 
benefitted from U.S. corporations inverting: 
[Pharma] employs less than two percent of Ireland’s 
workforce, yet data published by the U.S. Commerce 
Department suggests that Ireland generated profits in 2011 of 
$21.8 billion for U.S. chemical and pharma companies. That 
is third of all foreign profits for U.S. companies in the sector, 
and about forty percent of all Irish corporate profits. U.S. 
pharma companies paid a tax rate of less than six percent on 
over $100 billion of Irish profits over the last decade, 
according to an FT analysis. It showed that the Irish 
subsidiaries of U.S. chemical companies have cut their tax 
rates far below the statutory rate, from an average of eight 
percent in the seven years to 2004 to 4.5 percent in the 
following seven years.134 
However, consider that the EU recently found fault with Irish tax 
policy with regard to at least one large company: Apple. The corporation 
has a long history with Ireland.135 In 1990, an Apple tax adviser said that 
Apple was the “largest employer in the Cork area with 1,000 employees 
and 500 persons engaged on a sub-contract basis.”136 The European 
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2014), http://www.rte.ie/news/2014/0930/648865-ireland-tax-apple/ [https://perma.cc/S7J2-ZAU7]. 
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Commission accused Irish officials of “giving Apple unlawful state aid 
masquerad[ing] as tax breaks.”137 The U.S. Senate seemed to agree, given 
that a Senate investigative panel used Apple’s relationship with Ireland as a 
“case study” when looking into “how American companies dodged taxes 
by shifting profits offshore.”138 Senators Levin and McCain claimed that 
Apple’s tax planning helped the corporation to avoid $44 billion over the 
course of four years.139  
According to the European Commission, “aggressive tax planning . . . 
erodes the tax base of Member States, which are already financially 
constrained.”140 Professor Kleinbard, of the University of Southern 
California’s Gould School of Law, writes, “The light bulb has gone off that 
trade wars by another name and conducted through the tax system are just 
as ruinous.”141 
C. Other Costs 
Avi-Yonah claims, “when a corporation engages in aggressive tax 
planning . . . it is breaching an implicit bargain with the state that created it, 
gave it legal rights, and created the conditions for it to make those same 
profits it is attempting to shield from tax.”142 Building on his argument that 
corporate inversions force a shifting of the tax burden onto domestic 
businesses, Dumler argues that such a burden could cause domestic 
corporations to hire less workers or pay lower wages.143 Shifting the 
burden onto individuals could have entirely different sorts of 
consequences. “Respected bar associations have . . . argu[ed] that corporate 
inversions not only impair the integrity of the voluntary compliance 
system, but also violate the spirit, if not the letter of the law.”144 
The IRS depends on voluntary compliance to raise revenue. The U.S. 
has a voluntary compliance rate of over eighty percent.145 But what if 
individuals and small-business owners were to witness large corporations 
with rich CEOs paying less in taxes, while their own tax burdens increase? 
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According to Dumler, the allowance of corporate inversions causes the 
public to “perceive[] the U.S. tax system as operating unfairly by allowing 
corporations to escape taxation, while requiring individuals to pick up the 
slack, thereby corroding the legitimacy of the governmental tax system.”146 
Less voluntary compliance will only magnify the problem. 
In one article, the writers claim other likely costs: employees seeing 
jobs shifted to foreign countries, increased fear of job loss, negative 
company image, barriers to long term survival of the company, difficulty 
for the U.S. government to provide necessary services, and political 
stresses in the new host country.147 These predictions don’t seem too far off 
when taking into account that, “many U.S. multinationals have shifted 
research, manufacturing, and regional headquarters overseas, resulting in 
600 U.S. companies employing 100,000 people in Ireland alone.”148 The 
most recent data shows that unemployment in the U.S. is at about 4.9 
percent.149 
D. Utilitarian Evaluation 
Have corporate inversion laws—particularly Section 7874—affected 
the overall level of happiness? Inversions have cost the U.S. billions of 
dollars, leaving an extra burden on individual taxpayers and small business 
owners.150 While this may have conferred some benefit on the Irish 
economy, inversions have hurt the U.S.151 And while corporations often 
claim their reason for inverting relates to their fiduciary duty owed to 
shareholders, sometimes shareholders end up losing money in the 
transaction.152 For example, “the inversion forces the U.S. stockholders to 
‘recognize’ gain . . . based on the difference between the fair market value 
of the shares of the new foreign parent that they receive and the adjusted 
basis that they had in the stock of the former domestic parent . . . that they 
surrendered in the exchange.”153 
Shareholders may end up with more concerns than the immediate gain 
or loss of stock value. “[O]nce the parent of the multinational corporate 
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group is established in a tax-haven country . . . the laws of that jurisdiction 
then govern the rights and obligations of the corporation.”154 This means 
that shareholders are not protected by U.S. law. Further, “unsophisticated 
or naïve shareholders” might not realize that an inversion is more than just 
a “technical maneuver with only tax implications.”155 Given these facts, it 
would be difficult to determine that Section 7874 passes muster under a 
utilitarian measure of morality.  
E. Deontological Evaluation 
Lawmakers’ motivations seem to be good in theory—fairness, 
equality, and protecting the tax base are all admirable goals. But stating 
one thing and then doing another raises questions about true motivations. 
For instance, lobbyists can influence lawmakers’ decisions.156 And, since 
the McDermott inversion in 1983, only a handful of piecemeal laws against 
inversions have come about.157 As discussed, supra, at least Section 163(j) 
does not even do what it was intended to do.158 Such a lofty goal as 
“fairness” is reminiscent of the “War on Drugs” or the “War on Terror,” 
which may sound admirable, but can never truly be won.159 Perhaps goals 
such as “fairness” or “equality” are merely politicians’ smoke and mirrors 
way of attempting to keep a tax base, which already disapproves of the 
IRS,160 relatively compliant with the tax law.  
 However, our laws appear to pass more easily under a 
deontological theory than under a utilitarian one. According to the 
literature accompanying laws and proposed laws, the motivation is moral. 
Although the outcomes have not been nearly as positive as the intentions, 
possibly, legislators’ intentions are good, even if their actions are not. 
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IV. MORAL LAWS WILL AID IN FIXING THE CORPORATE TAX AVOIDANCE 
ACHIEVED THROUGH INVERSIONS 
What is the importance of an inquisition into the morality of laws? 
Well, focusing on utilitarianism and deontology forces legislators to 
evaluate their decisions both from a personal standpoint and from a more 
objective and future-looking standpoint. Legislators seem to agree, at least, 
that something needs to be done about corporate inversions. Their 
motivations for change inform the direction corporate inversion laws 
should go. 
A. Motivations 
Motivation for proposed changes to corporate inversion law appears to 
center around equality. According to Representative Danny Davis, the Stop 
Corporate Inversions Act of 2014 is “about fairness.”161 Representative 
Davis said, “At its heart, it says that America should not have two sets of 
rules: one for ordinary folks and one for those with armies of lawyers who 
can skirt and bend the law to avoid paying their fair share of taxes. This is 
a notion so fundamental to our democracy it seems it should be self-
evident.”162 Representative Davis’s comments echo the familiar notions of 
equality so fundamental to our nation, which have been spoken and written 
about since Thomas Jefferson wrote, in the Declaration of Independence, 
“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal . . . 
.”163 Admirable in theory, sure, but despite our oft-quoted core belief in 
equality, our nation’s history contains numerous examples of the constant 
struggle between those who would like equal rights, and those who seek to 
deny them.164  
Representative Davis isn’t the only politician spouting fairness and 
equality rhetoric. Representative Jan Schakowsky pointed out that 
corporations reap the benefits of “tax-payer funded research, our 
transportation infrastructure, our top-rate education system and productive 
employees it produces, and our world-leading economy.”165 She claims that 
these same corporations “have used inversions to avoid their fair share of 
U.S. taxes—taxes that pay for the investments that have helped them profit 
and thrive.”166 Representative Rosa DeLauro’s sentiments resemble 
Representative Schakowsky’s: “[w]e can’t continue to stand by idly while 
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companies avoid taxes at the expense of everyone else.”167 
Lawmakers say they want to stop corporate inversions in order to 
lessen unfairness, or inequality toward other taxpayers. But according to 
the Department of the Treasury, fairness to individual and small business 
taxpayers isn’t the only concern. The Treasury Department’s explanations 
of revenue proposals contains two other motivations for change. First, 
“[i]nversion transactions raise significant policy concerns because they 
facilitate the erosion of the U.S. tax base through deductible payments by 
the remaining U.S. members of the multinational group to the non-U.S. 
members and through aggressive transfer pricing for transactions between 
such U.S. and non-U.S. members.”168 Again, the erosion of the U.S. tax 
base plays a forefront role in motivating change. Second, “[t]here is no 
policy reason to permit a domestic entity to engage in an inversion 
transaction when its owners retain a controlling interest in the resulting 
entity, only minimal operational changes are expected, and there is 
significant potential for substantial erosion of the U.S. tax base.”169 That 
leaves a positive and a negative reason: (1) allowing inversions erodes the 
U.S. tax base and (2) there is no policy reason to allow them.  
While there exists ample commentary from lawmakers on why 
corporate inversion law needs to be changed, little exists on why they have 
chosen certain solutions over others. U.S. lawmakers must change the way 
they look at consequences and motivations in order to create a moral body 
of laws. 
B. Current Proposals for Change  
The following are proposed changes to corporate inversion law. Note 
the piecemeal nature of these proposals, and how none truly address the 
problem. 
1. Stop Corporate Inversions Act of 2015 (S. 198 and H.R. 415) 
Boasting projected estimated savings of $34 billion in tax revenue,170 
the Stop Corporate Inversions Act171 (SCIA) would amend section 7874. 
There are three main provisions of the act: (1) SCIA would require 
shareholders of the foreign corporation to own at least fifty percent of the 
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new, combined corporation (up from twenty percent previously);172 (2) 
even if fifty percent is owned by shareholders of the foreign corporation, 
inversion is still prohibited “if the affiliated group that includes the 
combined foreign corporation is managed and controlled in the United 
States and engages in significant domestic business activities in the United 
States;”173 and (3) SCIA would repeal the sixty to eighty percent ownership 
test.174 The bill was originally introduced on May 8, 2014, and would 
therefore apply to all inversions completed after that date.175  
SCIA comes after an administrative proposal to curb corporate 
inversions, since more than forty inversions have occurred since Section 
7874 was enacted in 2004.176  
2. No Federal Contracts for Corporate Deserters Act of 2015 (H.R. 
1809) 
Simply put, the No Federal Contracts for Corporate Deserters Act 
(NFCCD) would deny federal contracts to corporations that have 
inverted.177 Detractors argue that the NFCCD would deter competition and 
put U.S. jobs at risk.178 These same detractors, however, argue that 
legislators must incentivize corporations to stay in the U.S. by lowering the 
corporate tax rate.179 But competing with tax rates as low as 12.5 percent 
(as in Ireland) is unreasonable because it would require cutting the current 
U.S. tax rate by nearly two thirds.180  
3. Proposed and Failed  
In 2014, aside from SCIA and NFCCD, Congress also proposed the 
Corporate Inverters Earnings Stripping Reform Act (CIESRA, S. 2786)181 
and the Pay What You Owe Before You Go Act (PWOBGA, S. 2895 and 
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H.R. 5549).182 Unlike SCIA and NFCCD, neither of these were renewed in 
2015. 
CIESRA contains two main provisions: (1) it “[a]mends the Internal 
Revenue Code to impose limitations on the tax deduction for interest paid 
by corporations which are designated as applicable entities (i.e., members 
of an expanded affiliated group which includes a surrogate foreign 
corporation which is not treated as a domestic corporation)” and (2) it 
“[p]rohibits such an entity from claiming a tax deduction for interest that 
exceeds 25% of its adjusted taxable income and from carrying forward 
interest which is paid or accrued during the first year in which such entity 
becomes an applicable entity.”183 The goal of CIESRA was to curb interest 
stripping transactions.184 
PWOGBA “[a]mends the [IRC] to require the recapture in subpart F 
income . . . the accumulated deferred foreign income of such 
corporation . . . for its last taxable year.”185 In other words, the U.S. would 
recapture foreign undistributed earnings over U.S. undistributed earnings 
which were not tax deferred.186 The purpose was “to include in income the 
unrepatriated earnings of groups that include an inverted corporation.”187   
C. Moral Proposals 
According to a 2002 Treasury Report, fairness, equality, and protection 
of the U.S. tax base are the three most important goals.188 Lawmakers 
should apply major theories of morality in order to write moral laws with 
greater ease. They should ask four questions in determining whether a law 
is morally sound: (1) Will this law create the greatest amount of happiness 
for the greatest amount of people?; (2) Will that happiness be sustainable?; 
(3) Are our motivations themselves moral?; and (4) Will this law 
contribute to a greater body of moral laws? In the following subsections, I 
will evaluate proposals for change while keeping these questions in mind. 
1. Incentivize Corporations to Remain in the U.S. 
Most of the enacted and proposed legislation has worked (or proposed 
                                                                                                                          
182 S. Res. 2895, 113th Cong. (2014); H. Res. 5549, 113th Cong. (2014). 
183 Corporate Inverters Earnings Stripping Reform Act of 2014, CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/2786 [https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-
congress/senate-bill/2786] (last visited Feb. 21, 2016). 
184 Id. 
185 Pay What You Owe Before You Go Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-
congress/senate-bill/2895 (last visited Feb. 21, 2016) [https://perma.cc/ARS2-JQ9D]. 
186 Id. 
187 S. 2895 (113th): Pay What You Owe Before You Go Act, GOVTRACK.US, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s2895 (last visited Feb. 21, 2016) [https://perma.cc/6YLG-
FUXN]. 
188 See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 2016] IMMORAL LEGISLATION AND TAX BENEFITS FOR EXPAT CORPORATIONS 1731 
to work) to penalize corporations that try to invert. It is worth considering, 
however, the possibility that offering corporations incentives not to invert 
might contribute to greater productivity and efficiency. Passing legislation 
that reduces the burden of individual taxpayers and small businesses while 
also providing incentives to corporations, if effective, would further 
utilitarian ends.  
Lawmakers should first look at “underlying conditions [that] lead[] to 
expatriation.”189 Such a goal might begin with revising and restructuring 
the piecemeal laws currently in place. Piecemeal laws, like trying to put out 
a large fire with cups of water, lack effectiveness. As soon as one of these 
laws is passed, multi-national corporations find work-arounds. For 
example, despite Section 7874, these corporations continue eroding the 
U.S. tax revenue base through methods such as: “income trapping using 
indefinite deferrals of active income in foreign countries; repatriation of 
excessive foreign tax credits; [and] avoidance of taxation on holding 
companies . . . .”190 Right now, corporate inversion law looks much like a 
game of “Whack-a-Mole.” When one mole is bopped, another pops its 
head up. This system’s inherent inadequacy won’t be fixed with more 
piecemeal laws.  
One of the most often suggested incentives, naturally, is to lower the 
corporate tax rate.191 To be sure, the U.S. does have a high corporate tax 
rate compared to other industrialized nations.192 But lowering the corporate 
tax rate to be competitive with popular inversion nations would create a 
slew of other problems. Most importantly, it would lead to greater after-tax 
income inequality.193 Further, in 2013 corporate taxes brought in $275 
billion in revenue.194 Cutting or severely reducing the corporate tax rate 
would leave a huge deficit to be made up by someone. This is to say that a 
small corporate tax rate decrease would necessarily hurt individuals and 
small businesses. While an in depth study of the exact reduction in the 
corporate tax rate that could be beneficial is beyond the scope of this note, 
see Figure 1195 for a measure of other industrialized nations’ current rates 
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and past high and low rates (in percentages). Note that many of these 
countries are currently at or near their lowest rates ever. In fact, the United 
States is the only country shown on the graph that has remained at about 
the same rate over time.  
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2. Enact the Stop Corporate Inversions Act  
Though part of the ongoing piecemeal legislative acts, enacting SCIA 
will make corporate inversions much more difficult than they currently are. 
The combination of lowering the corporate tax rate to lessen the motivation 
to invert and making inversions more difficult (and possibly more 
expensive for the corporation) should minimize the number of companies 
that invert. SCIA works to beef up the important, but only semi-effective, 
Section 7874 and should not (yet) be abandoned.  
The IRS continues to utilize Section 7874 as a tool to increase 
restrictions on inversions. In December of 2015, the IRS issued a notice 
(the Notice) laying out additional regulations to cut down on inversions 
structured to avoid the governance of Section 7874.196 There are a couple 
of updates provided in this notice, two of which I will outline, as they are 
the main substantive updates to the 7874 regulations. It will be helpful to 
lay these out in order to show how the IRS tries to catch up with inversions 
schemes. 
First, the Notice addresses inversion schemes that take advantage of 
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the substantial business activity exception by utilizing third countries, 
generally tax havens, to avoid taxes.197 In other words, a foreign 
corporation will acquire the U.S. corporation (together called the 
“expanded affiliated group,” or “EAG”) and the EAG will have substantial 
business activity in the foreign country, but the foreign acquiring 
corporation will have achieved tax residency in a tax haven country. Under 
the new regulations, the EAG “cannot have substantial business activities 
in the relevant foreign country when compared to the EAG’s total business 
activities unless the foreign acquiring corporation is subject to tax as a 
resident of the relevant foreign country.”198  
Second, the Notice further addresses third country schemes describing 
such transactions as ones in which, “the stock or assets of the existing 
foreign corporation are acquired by the new third-country parent, and the 
shareholders of the existing foreign corporation receive more than 20 
percent of the stock of the new third-country parent.”199 Such set ups 
“erode the U.S. tax base.”200 Further, the IRS and Department of the 
Treasury have discovered that, in these scenarios, “the likelihood that there 
is a sufficient non-tax business purpose for replacing the U.S. parent with a 
foreign parent is significantly lower than Congress assumed when it 
established the 80-percent threshold.”201 The regulations will now 
disregard such stock when determining whether the eighty percent 
threshold has been met.202 
The Notice clarifies the definitions of important topics such as 
avoidance property and inversion gain income.203 The effectiveness of 
these changes remains to be seen, but the very BandAid-like nature sparks 
doubt. In any event, 7874 remains the IRS’s greatest tool against 
inversions, so SCIA should be enacted to give 7874 more power. 
3. Regulations that Provide Guidance for Corporations Wishing to 
Move Abroad  
IRC § 367204 provides an example of how we might structure laws in 
the best interest of the greatest number of people. Section 367 governs the 
transfers of property from the United States to a foreign corporation.205 
Under this section, the IRS can stop a transfer from receiving 
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nonrecognition status under IRC § 351.206 The regulations provide 
guidance on which transfers Section 367 should apply to.207 A similar 
system could work well for corporate inversions. 
Some corporations have important, non-tax-related reasons for moving 
to a different country. For example, some corporations are owned primarily 
by U.S. shareholders, but do the majority of their business in another 
country. These transfers should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 
Regulations could provide further guidance on what constitutes residency. 
A discretionary law like this would be more workable than a large change, 
such as lowering or getting rid of the corporate tax, or changing the U.S. to 
a territorial system of taxation. Rather than hurting small businesses and 
individuals by lowering the corporate tax rate, we could simply evaluate 
each corporation’s status based on its own situation. And changing the U.S. 
to a territorial rather than a worldwide system of taxation would not work 
as well as my proposal for two reasons: nations with territorial systems still 
face a corporate inversion problem and the U.S. already gives foreign tax 
credits to corporations. 
4. Change the Definition of Corporate Residence 
Another workable solution would be to change how corporate 
residence is defined. This solution would supplement the previously 
proposed solution. If corporate residents included corporations with U.S. 
management, only corporations that are truly foreign corporations would 
benefit. This would also complement current corporate tax inversion 
statutes like 7874. Again, the regulations could be left to provide precise 
guidelines.   
5. Include IP in Subpart F 
Finally, Subpart F should be broadened to include income from CFCs 
holding U.S.-generated patents or other intellectual property. This would 
help to counteract the benefit of Ireland offering a zero percent tax rate on 
IP transfers,208 and other exploitation that has followed.209  
Limiting the IP benefits of inverting, re-defining corporate residence, 
and allowing exceptions on a case-by-case basis would make it much more 
difficult for corporations to invert, while allowing for genuine foreign 
corporations to operate in their country of business. As it is, corporations 
take advantage of allowances in the IRC. By definition they cannot be held 
                                                                                                                          
206 26 U.S.C. § 351 (2012); 26 U.S.C. § 367(a)1. 
207 26 C.F.R. § 1.367(a)–(b). 
208 Harpaz, supra note 132. 
209 Simpson, supra note 130, at 683 (“Corporations may also use agreements that share the cost of 
intellectual property research and development between the foreign parent and the U.S. subsidiary, and 
that provide the foreign parent with rights to exploit the intellectual property abroad and the U.S. 
subsidiary with rights to use the intellectual property in the United States.”). 
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accountable for moral decisions, as they exist solely for the benefit of 
shareholders. It is only natural (and good business) to take advantage of 
legal tax loopholes. In order to take the burden of corporate tax avoidance 
off small businesses and individual taxpayers, we must change the 
fundamentals of inversion laws.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Numerous commentators have remarked upon the measure of a 
corporation’s morality when it inverts. In light of cases such as Hobby 
Lobby210 and Citizen’s United,211 it is not surprising that some attribute 
morality to corporations. But this note argues that assessing a corporation’s 
morality and admonishing it for acting in a perceived immoral way is 
fruitless because corporations are meant to act for their shareholders—not 
for the greater good. Instead, we should examine the laws that permit 
corporations to act against the best interest of the nation, as these laws are 
passed by representatives elected by the people to act in their interest. 
Though the question of whether state actors can act morally may not be 
resolved, I argue that we must assume that they can. Certainly a better case 
can be made for measuring the morality of state actors than corporations. 
The State holds the power to set strict rules by which corporations must 
abide.  
When writing new laws, legislators should keep four main questions in 
mind, with the goal of answering each in the affirmative: (1) Will this law 
create the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest amount of people?; 
(2) Will that happiness be sustainable?; (3) Are our motivations themselves 
moral?; and (4) Will this law contribute to a greater body of moral laws? 
I believe that, in answering these questions in the affirmative, there are 
five ways in which we can lessen the occurrence of corporate tax 
inversions. First, we should examine incentives for corporations to remain 
in the States while keeping the interests of small businesses and individual 
taxpayers at the forefront. Second, in order to buff up current anti-inversion 
legislation, SCIA should be passed. Third, issue regulations in the spirit of 
Section 367 that will provide better guidelines for corporations that wish to 
move abroad. Fourth, change the definition of corporate residence to 
include corporations with U.S. management. Finally, include IP in Subpart 
F. 
These are workable solutions that mostly avoid the traditional 
piecemeal laws. Instead of always being one step behind corporations, 
                                                                                                                          
210 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014) (finding that for-profit 
corporations have the right to religious freedom). 
211 See Citizens United v. Federal Elections Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 349 (2010) (finding that 
corporations’ political speech is protected under the First Amendment). 
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legislators should rework the very definitions that permit corporations to 
invert. Legislators must also understand that the moral impetus to lessen 
the tax burden on small businesses and individuals is theirs alone. We 
cannot rely on corporations to do anything other than what is in the best 
interest of shareholders. For this reason, legislators must take on the 
responsibility. 
 
